

**Peace and War in the World after Westphalia  
Some Reflections on the Challenges of a Changing  
International Order**

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It belongs to the conventional wisdom to date the emergence of the present international order to the great settlements after the Thirty Years War in Europe. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 is normally seen as the codification of the emergence of an international order based on orderly and sovereign states.

Since then, the different convulsions of the international order have all in essence been based on the principles established then. The international

order has been an order of orderly states. It is thus appropriate to talk about the long Westphalian order spanning the later part of the previous millennium.

In retrospect, we might say that there were two preconditions underlying this Westphalian order.

The first was that the evolution of technology and finance established a situation in which only states really could muster the resources to fundamentally threaten the existence or fundamental interests of another state. It thus took states to conduct war, and it accordingly also took states to make and uphold a peace.

The second was that the internal order and situation of a state remained solely the concern of the ruler of that particular state. This was of course key to the Westphalian settlement since the religious wars that had torn Europe apart had often been based on interference by one ruler in the territories of other rulers in order to protect believers in one or other version of the religious faith of the time.

Although these principles have remained fundamental since then, they have of course not been universally respected or not been under an amount of threat.

For a while, the rise of well-organized naval piracy threatened the monopoly of power and force of the states. But when this threat developed beyond a certain level, intervention by states forced an end to the practice. The naval action against the so called Barbary States of North Africa, which were semi-private pirating ventures, re-established the order, and also marked the first military appearance of the United States on the wider international scene.

Interventions in order to affect the internal order of states haven't been entirely unknown either. There was a revolutionary impulse in the

Napoleonic armies as they set out to first conquer and then re-order Europe, although the effort ended in failure, and reaction came to dominate the European scene for a long time thereafter. And the successive interventions towards the decaying Ottoman Empire were more often than not motivated by an expressed desire to protect primarily its different Christian communities. As a result of this, there were even elaborate international arrangements for state- or nation-building in complex multi-ethnic areas like Macedonia a century ago.

The two great efforts of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to build a new international order – the League of Nations after the First and the United Nations after the Second World War – remained based on the Westphalian order on respect for the sovereignty of states, although other elements were gradually being added.

In the League of Nations, elaborate systems for the protection of minorities were built into the system, aiming at putting some limits on the sovereignty of the states on these important issues. But when the United Nations was set up, minority issues were replaced by a not necessarily more concrete commitment to the protection of universal values of human rights. But in spite of its name, the organization was in reality an organization of states rather than nations, and most certainly not one of individuals. The opening line of its Charter – “We, the Peoples...” – should really be “We, the States...”

The Charter of the United Nations was specific in limiting the legitimate use of force in international affairs to either self-defence – Article 51 - or such actions that had been authorized by the Security Council of the Organization. The United Nations thus represented a continuation and codification of the Westphalian order, although it sought to place the relationship between the states within a firmer legal context.

During the decades of the Cold War, there is no doubt that we saw massive violations of the principles underlying the Charter of the United Nations. The Soviet Union was not adverse to giving open or clandestine support to

different so called revolutionary movements around the world, and its establishment of a belt of satellite regimes in Central Europe in the 1940's through a series of coup d'Etat's was of course a gross violation of the principles of non-interference. When its forces invaded Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 they did so on pretexts that had no international legal validity whatsoever. Neither did the United States, on occasion, felt itself unnecessarily bound by the limitations of international law when protecting its interests or engaging in what it considered the fight against the forces of communism.

It was thus after the fall of the Soviet Empire in 1989 – 1991 that hopes were ignited for a New World Order in which the United Nations and its legal system would come to its true fruition. The marshalling of a great military coalition under the full authority of the United Nations to expel Iraq from Kuwait was only one part of what seemed to be an emerging new global order based on the primacy of the United Nations, cooperation between the major powers and an increasing respect for international law.

But soon these hopes were dashed, we were confronted with a global situation where disorder was more dominant than order, and the key pillars of the Westphalian system came under attack and threat. During the last few years, we have seen both the two main pillars of the Westphalian order starting to crumble.

While the principle of state sovereignty was previously seen as sacrosanct, the combination of the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, and the non-intervention by the international community in Rwanda in 1995, have led to an intense discussion on the right or duty to intervene in sovereign states in order to prevent massive violations of human rights.

And in contrast to the previous unchallenged dominance of the state in the international system, the September 2001 attacks against the United States illustrated the threat that the marriage between modern technologies and

ancient hatreds can present even the most powerful state with. Small bands of dedicated individuals can now have the power to threaten the fundamental interest of the most powerful of states.

This, in its turn, has led to a debate on the right to intervene in order to pre-empt threat of this sort from developing. The publication of the US National Security Strategy a year after the devastating attack ignited a major international debate on the issue.

Although the attack on the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq was motivated in different ways, most importantly by it being in material breach of numerous resolutions of the UN Security Council<sup>1</sup>, it was the perception that these breaches were part of a pattern of rapid development of weapons of mass destruction that gave the issue the urgency it was presented with.

Taken together, these developments have led to a debate on whether we are on our way towards an international order that has firmly left the foundations of the previous Westphalian order behind. We might feel compelled to intervene for humanitarian reasons in cases where existing governments have collapsed or are clearly failing in their duty to protect their citizens, and we might feel the necessity to intervene when there are imminent and serious threats of destruction towards our societies that can't be handled otherwise.

Now, there is a need to look at both of these issues in the light of the lessons learnt, and to try to draw the appropriate conclusions.

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<sup>1</sup> UN Security Resolution 1441 – adopted unanimously – stated that “Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687”. It also recalled, that “in its resolution 687 the Council declared that a ceasefire would be based on the acceptance by Iraq on the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq contained therein.” In spite of this, Iraq was given “a final opportunity” to comply, and the Council recalled that the country “will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.”

In the United States, the doctrine of pre-emption announced in the National Security Strategy seems to command wide support<sup>2</sup>, with the present debate focusing on whether a pre-emptive attack against Afghanistan should have been launched before September 11. In the European Union, the adoption in December 2003 of the European Security Strategy showed a new awareness of the new challenges that the changed international security environment presents. Recently, the UN Secretary General appointed a high-level panel that has been asked to look into how the United Nations can be reformed in this new international situation. It is scheduled to report in December of this year.

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This paper is written from a European as well as personal perspective. It is important to recognize that perspectives on these issues are different in the different parts of the world.

Much of our theory of international relations, as well as principles underlying the global order, has been derived from the lessons learnt during the centuries of war and peace on the European continent. A Europe-centric worldview is certainly to be avoided in our world of today, but it remains a regrettable fact that it is the conflicts in Europe that twice during the last century lead to wars that spanned the globe. Neither can we overlook the fact that most Europeans are only a generation away from the experience of wars that shattered the life of nations and families in a profound way. The

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<sup>2</sup> It should be noted that the concept of pre-emption is not exclusive to the Bush administration. President Bush stated in his State of the Union address 2002, that "when the threat is imminent, the nation has the right to conduct pre-emptive operations." Echoing this, Senator John Kerry recently said that "allies give us more hands in the struggle, but no President would ever let them tie our hands and prevent us from doing what must be done. As President, I will not wait for a green light from abroad when our safety is at stake." The difference in principle is not easy to detect.

word genocide had to be invented to describe a European 20<sup>th</sup> century reality.

These particular European experiences have coloured the reaction of most Europeans in the ongoing international debate on these issues.

On the one hand, Europe has seen the consequences of regimes that violate the fundamental principles of human rights perhaps more clearly than other parts of the world. A regime that attacks its own citizens sooner or later risks attacking also its neighbours. While representatives of many developing countries see doctrines of humanitarian intervention as little more than a new version of old-style colonialism, or even attempts to break up their states to prevent them from becoming too powerful, standing idle by as dictators or despots are running wild can never be a European policy after the experiences of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

On the other side, Europe has experienced the devastating consequences of war more profoundly than many other parts of the world. Within the living memory of large numbers of Europeans, millions of people have been slaughtered, towns and homes have been devastated and entire regions have been forced to flee for their lives. War is not a concept treated easily after such experiences.

Pre-emption is not an entirely alien concept in European history. When Napoleon returned to Paris from Elba in 1815, the anti-Napoleonic coalition decided on and implemented a policy of pre-emption of the new threat that they were certain was coming. And it has often been argued, that a strategy of pre-emption against Hitler as he re-occupied the Rhineland in 1936 could have caused his regime to fall.

But against this should be put the horrible historical legacy of the summer of pre-emption 1914, when a chain of mutually reinforcing pre-emptive moves took Europe from the assassination in Sarajevo to world war in little

more than a month. One has learnt that doctrines of pre-emption can turn into a contagious disease with potentially devastating consequences.

Across the Atlantic, perspectives are often different. While “war” to an audience in the United States is something that happens elsewhere, with the brave soldiers going out and the “heroes” coming home soon thereafter, the word “war” has a distinctly different ring to a European ear. Here, “war” is something that sooner or later risks coming home to you with all of the devastating consequences numerous generations of Europeans have seen.

Thus, while in the United States “war” is routinely proclaimed also as part of a purely domestic agenda, in Europe the world could not officially be used for the de facto war over Kosovo in 1999.

With some simplification, the difference in attitudes between the United States and most of Europe on the issue of war can be seen as disagreement over the validity of the theories of Clausewitz.

While his famous dictum that war is the continuation of politics by other means comes naturally in a state where one of the most important functions of the president is to be commander-in-chief of the armed forces, attitudes in Europe are different. On this side of the Atlantic, war isn't primarily seen as the continuation of politics, but rather as the failure of politics. Time after time, we have seen a readiness to go from diplomacy to armed action in the United States while there has been a substantial hesitancy in Europe. Geography as well as history has driven political attitudes in slightly different directions.

Although there is this significant cultural difference between Europe and the United States, there are of course significant divergences also within Europe. Both the United Kingdom and France maintain armed forces where important elements are geared for expeditionary warfare and interventions in more distant areas. Although a legacy from their colonial past, these

capabilities have in recent years become increasingly important as part of different international stability operations.

Recent British intervention in support of the UN in Sierra Leone, and French intervention in Ivory Coast in support of its authorities and with the endorsement of the UN, can be seen as examples of this. The commitment of both nations to the retaining of these capabilities is best illustrated by the UK decision to build two new aircraft carriers and the French decision to build a second new carrier. In both Paris and London, there is a Clausewitzian tendency stronger than in other European capitals, although still on a level well below that found in the political atmosphere of Washington.

But in spite of this, it must be recognized that there remains a significant difference between the strategic culture of the United States and what there is of a common strategic culture in the countries of the European Union.

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The Westphalian international order was dominated by state threats against states, while the post-Westphalian order to a far larger extent is dominated by non-state threats, inter-state conflicts as well as a multitude of trans-national challenges.

In the old order, threats to the security and survival of states almost invariably originated from other states. Until 1989, it was the threat of Soviet invasion that defined the security order in Europe.

Since then, weak and imploding states have turned out to be far more of a security challenge than strong and expanding ones at the same time as different trans-national challenges have made their contribution to the reordering of the international system. The emergence of the organized forces

of religious fundamentalist terrorism has added to this. We live in a profoundly changed global security environment.

This does not mean that old challenges have disappeared altogether. The series of wars in the Balkans demonstrated the continued strength of nationalist forces. In this case, they contributed to the breaking up of existing state structures, while in others it can be envisaged that the same sentiments can fuel the flames that could lead to inter-state aggression of a more conventional model.

It was the collapse of the old Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that led to the decade of war from 1991 in Slovenia to 2001 in Macedonia as the one state structure after the other was challenged and old nationalist fears and passions were revived. As we started to struggle with the new challenges of a new international order, we were brutally reminded of the force that old issues and old challenges still have. In a world of new challenge, the Balkans served notice that the old ones must not be neglected.

And since 2001, we have become far more aware of the dangers that could originate from zones of chaos and disorder in the different parts of the world where we see fragile, failing or failed states.

These dangers come in different forms.

In the more extreme form, we have seen how these zones outside the international state system can become havens for terrorist groups, with the Al Qaida take-over of parts of Taliban-run Afghanistan as the foremost example. In no less serious forms, we have witnessed how such areas can become the origin of a drug that not only fuels local conflicts, but also finances vast networks of internationally organized crime and eventually leads to destructive dependence and eventually death in the midst of our own society.

The cocaine market in America is as much fuelled from the state-less areas of conflict-ridden Colombia as are the heroin markets of Europe from the state-less areas of post-conflict Afghanistan. When states fracture and collapse, we have also seen how this often triggers humanitarian catastrophes and often lead to the eruption of cycles of violence that easily descends into tribal or national conflicts with the risk of genocide-like situations always in existence.

More often than not, we see the risk of these different developments reinforcing each other and creative negative spirals of increasingly dangerous character.

When a state starts to fail completely or in part, zones of chaos and lawlessness creates opportunities both for extremist groups and for networks of organized criminality. These, in turn, extend over borders, often causing the cancer of chaos and instability to spread. Not infrequently, we see these developments associated with national or cultural links or divides that covers larger regions and acting as transmission belts of chaos and conflicts across state boundaries. Thus, there is not only the risk of grave violations of human rights, including in extreme cases genocide, but also of regional destabilization.

In whole or in part, this is what we have seen in the Balkans, in Central Asia connected with Afghanistan, the Great Lakes region of Africa as well as substantial parts of West Africa and the borderlands immediately South of the Sahara. But the tendencies have also been there in parts of the Caucasus, areas of the Andean region in Latin America, the Indonesian archipelago as well as the Philippines.

Not always related to these issues are those connected with the spread of the technologies of weapons of mass destruction. Originating in sophisticated research laboratories there is however the risk that these technologies spread to the groups using the areas of chaos and conflict.

While classic policies of deterrence might still work in preventing more or less rational state actors from using these weapons, such policies are of no use against dedicated terrorist groups, often motivated by a religious or political fundamentalism beyond rationality.

Thus, we are increasingly faced with the question of our rights to intervene in the one way or the other in these situations, sometimes as part of our efforts to safeguard our own citizens, and sometimes as part of wider efforts to uphold more universal human values and averting more serious threats to global stability.

# # #

Intervention remains a charged word. To a large extent, we are still politically programmed by an earlier age of more complete state sovereignty, and when any sort of outside interference or interventions in the affairs of one state was to be avoided. The resistance to interference and interventions has its firm historical roots in the Westphalian order of sovereign, independent and well-ordered states.

But today we live in a world of increasing interdependence between states, and thus of de facto gradually reduced independence of the different state units of the international system. When we speak about the accelerating process of globalisation, we are at the same time speaking about an accelerating process of interdependence that step-by-step undermines the old independence of the sovereign states.

Gradually, the international system seeks to formalize this interdependence, and create universally accepted instruments for what we might call “soft interventions”, in the affairs of the different states. Nearly every major international institution, and primarily those set up as part of the United Nations system or remaining from the League of Nations order, has more or

less elaborate instruments and systems for soft intervention. These can range from agreements that just limit the freedom of action of states in different respects over more intrusive instruments of evaluation of different state policies and recommendations on how they could be changed to more elaborate institutions of inspections and international decisions that have to be respected.

The more globalisation proceeds and interdependence thus increases, the more are we likely to see of these different forms of these soft interventions. The different mechanisms of the World Trade Organisation most definitely interferes in the internal lives of different states, the surveillance mechanisms of the International Monetary Fund have a power that is forcefully reinforced by the powers of the international financial markets, and the different instruments of inspection and information exchange of the World Health Organisation are as intrusive as they are necessary in an age where an infectious disease can travel the globe in just hours.

As this development accelerates in the coming decade, we could perhaps speak of a system where there is a continuum of interventions, ranging from the softest to the hardest, but all aiming at securing that the different states don't deviate too much from the norms and values that underpin the evolving international system. In trying to secure common values, and react to threats against them, the global system would thus rely on an escalation ladder of instruments ranging from diplomacy in order to create an international legal order and the force of public opinion at the one end of the scale to hard military-dominated interventions in the extreme cases at the other.

To gradually extend the networks and structures of interdependence, integration and soft intervention is by no means uncontroversial. In Europe, there is a vigorous debate about how far the powers of the different common European institutions should be allowed to go. In the United States, tolerance against the decrees of international institutions is often even less,

although at the end of the day informed opinion normally comes to the conclusion that a United States inside the international order is better than one outside of it. In other countries that consider themselves powers of some consequence one often finds reactions not too dissimilar from those of the United States. On the recent controversial issue of the International Criminal Court, neither Russia, nor China or India accepts its jurisdiction.

But more controversial than this gradual evolution of the international system of soft interventions is the question of the need for harder interventions, including the use of violence, in cases where it is both obvious that hardening soft interventions are not enough and where the issues at stake are considered to be of particular importance also from a wider global perspective.

A massive break-down of attempts to prevent massive violations of human rights, and complete collapse of the willingness or ability of a state to help and assist its citizens or a more or less imminent threat of both the spread and the use of weapons of mass destruction are cases where the question of hard interventions are immediately on the table. Kosovo, Somalia, Iraq or Haiti can be seen – irrespective of the merits of the individual cases – as examples of the issues and dilemmas we are confronted with in these different cases.

The ideal scenario is for such a situation to be addressed by the Security Council, perhaps after having been brought to its attention by the Secretary General, resulting in a resolution binding on all concerned, and mandating either the United Nations itself, or a coalition of the willing and able, to use force in order to assure compliance with the provisions of the resolution.

For all the disagreements over the past few years, there remains universal agreement that this is the preferred and best option in practically all of these situations. Such a course of action secures the legality of any action taken, thus gives it legitimacy and thereby increases the chances of the hard

intervention also being successful in achieving the aims set. Thus, it seems likely that in most cases in the future, taking the issue to the Security Council will remain among the first options considered when faced with situations like the ones described above. Indeed, this should be the case.

It might be that the case for doing so would be strengthened even further if there were a possibility to change the composition of the Security Council so as to reflect the realities of today rather than those of an increasingly distant past. But while it over time would make perfect sense for the European Union to become a permanent member of the Council, amalgamating the present British or French positions, as well as enlarging this group also with powers like Japan, India or Brazil, the likelihood of this happening within the foreseeable future is very close to nil.

While it is useful to keep up the debate on the composition of the Security Council, it seems futile to spend too much energy on it, and it is anyhow questionable whether a thus enlarged and reformed council would be able to perform better than the one we are actually having.

Irrespectively of this, we are likely to continue to be confronted with the occasional situations in which states that start by bringing an issue to the attention of the Security Council at the end of the day decide to take action with the full authorization of it.

During recent decades, we have seen numerous examples of states intervening also militarily in other states without even seeking the sanction of the UN Security Council. India did so in East Pakistan in 1971, thus contributing to the creation of Bangladesh, Tanzania invaded Idi Amin's Uganda in 1978 – 79 and Vietnam did the same versus Cambodia during the same years. Although some also humanitarian motives could be put forward for these interventions, they were primarily motivated by more traditional national concerns.

The more recent cases of Kosovo and Iraq are different from these in that the key debates prior to intervention took place in the Security Council. There was a fair degree of agreement on the issues at stake, but at the end of the day a parting of ways when it came to authorizing hard interventions.

The experience shows that we must seek criteria's broader than just the formal legal authority of the Security Council in order to assess whether a hard intervention should be undertaken or not. Experience shows that there are several criteria's of importance, and it is rare that all of them are met in every case.

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When a hard intervention is contemplated, one should aim at fulfilling three different but inter-related criteria.

First, one should seek to assure its legality. Second, one should seek to broaden its legitimacy. And third, one should do the utmost to increase its chances of efficiency in meeting the objectives set.

If – as in the recent cases of Kosovo and Iraq – the hard intervention does not fulfil all the criteria for being legal under international law, this obviously deprives it of a critical amount of legitimacy, which in its turn makes it more difficult to achieve the third requirement of effectiveness in achieving the aims of the intervention.

But the relationship between these three requirements is by no means clear-cut. That an action is formally legal does not automatically assure it of the legitimacy that is defined as it being accepted as necessary and perhaps even just by most of those affected by or concerned with the issues of the intervention in question. And one can well see intervention that are both legal and legitimate but which are most unlikely to achieve their stated goals anyhow.

For democracies, the legitimacy of hard interventions is a critically important issue. A democratic political system will simply not accept the burdens of a hard intervention if it is not seen as having legitimacy in the one way or the other. By far the best way of laying the ground for the legitimacy of an operation remains to have it endorsed by the UN Security Council, thus taking away any discussion concerning the formal legality of the action.

But increasingly it is argued that some form of legitimacy can be given to a hard intervention also in other ways than an explicit decision by the UN Security Council.

Some of these issues can be illustrated with the case of Kosovo.

Here, where there was substantially less legal foundation for hard intervention in Security Council resolutions than in the case of Iraq, it was argued that some legitimacy to the air campaign was given by the decisions of the North Atlantic Council, bringing together most of the democracies of North America and Western Europe. But the most important contribution to the legitimacy of the air campaign was undoubtedly the television images of the nearly a million refugees fleeing the province during the fighting. The intervention was seen as a necessary response to the humanitarian disaster and the ethnic cleansing.

But the roots of the military intervention were different. The threat of the use of air power had been introduced in order to try to force the Milosevic regime into accepting a draft peace agreement. While the threat of the use of force is explicitly prohibited under the UN Charter, it had undoubtedly gained certain legitimacy when Kofi Annan had returned from Baghdad in 1998 claiming that “diplomacy backed by force” had brought the success that he was seen as having achieved.

This is less of a problem when the threat works than when it does not. Then, the original issue is often translated into an issue of the credibility of the issuer of the threat, and one risks entering a slippery slope in which the purpose of the threatened military action evolves into something that could be very different.

In the Kosovo case, Milosevic was not ready to give in to these threats, and the issues of credibility immediately come into play. This gained added weight since the threat to bomb Milosevic had been a key part of the efforts that had succeeded in persuading the Kosovo Albanian side to accept the draft agreement. A threat that had been introduced as a diplomatic tool thus quickly became something very different when that diplomacy had failed.

When, as a consequence of the credibility issue, NATO initiated the air campaign, it was motivated by the need to avert an imminent humanitarian disaster. Although there had been brutal fighting in Kosovo, and a substantial number of people had been displaced, fighting had been relatively limited, and there were as of yet no streams of refugees crossing the borders.

The air campaign proved to be far longer and more complicated than those taking part in the decisions had obviously anticipated. Large-scale fighting immediately flared up on the ground, and when the flood of refugees started coming, it soon became clear that air power was an instrument with only a very limited possibility of influencing ground fighting of this sort.

After nearly two months of an air campaign that gradually concentrated less on influencing the situation on the ground in Kosovo than inflicting strategic damage on Serbia, fighting came to an end with an agreement that affirmed the sovereignty of Yugoslavia over Kosovo while placing it under a UN administration but otherwise failed to address any of the core issues of the conflict. If the threat of military intervention had been introduced as an instrument to achieve a peace settlement, it produced a situation where this

looked more elusive than ever. It was somewhat ironic, that while the military intervention had been initiated against the background of a deeply split Security Council, the military campaign

could only be brought to an end by the key members of the Security Council coming together again on a political strategy.<sup>3</sup>

The Kosovo war also illustrates the complexities of the third criteria that should be used when trying to analyse possible situations of hard interventions. As the aim of the use of force was described in very different ways as the conflict progressed, the ultimate objective of the intervention was also described in very different ways.

The core of the conflict was the question of sovereignty over the province of Kosovo. The Serb sovereignty over the area was militarily challenged by the KLA fighters, and they made little secret of their aim of freeing it from Serb control and establishing either a new independent state of Kosovo or joining up the different Albanian lands in some sort of state structure. Throughout the conflict, representatives of NATO countries clearly disassociated themselves from these aims, and in the text that was presented to Milosevic, and lead to the withdrawal of Serb forces from the province and the setting up of an interim UN administration, the sovereignty of Yugoslavia over Kosovo was reaffirmed in even stronger terms than had been the case in the different attempts at political settlement prior to the open conflict.

As for the humanitarian aims of the intervention, the months after saw the return of close to a million refugees and displaced persons, almost all of them of Albanian nationality, but also the more or less forced expulsion of up towards a quarter of a million non-Albanians after the arrival of NATO forces and the UN. Thus, if the aim was the protection of the Kosovo Albanians, that aim was met, but if the aim was protection of human and minority

rights in more general terms, and a stop to ethnic cleansing, the effect was little more than turning the tables in a centuries old conflict.

If previously Albanians have been a repressed minority in Serbia, now Serbs were a repressed minority in Kosovo. As long as the core issue of the conflict has not been settled, and the consequences of that settlement for the wider regional order are clear, it will be difficult to draw up a balance sheet as to the efficiency of the Kosovo intervention in meeting more than some of the most immediate aims.<sup>3 4</sup>

What the Kosovo example illustrates is that we should give far more attention to the possible efficiency as well as long-term political goals of different hard interventions. Although the decision-making process is often driven by short-term considerations, it is with the long-term consequences of these interventions we will live, and by which they will eventually be judged.

Interventions to protect a national minority, as was the case in Kosovo, are sometimes fraught with other dangers. We should not overlook that concern for the rights of minorities could be used as a pretext for quite different motives. That Hitler used the provisions for the protection of minorities in the League of Nations system in his campaigns versus both Czechoslovakia and Poland, claiming that the rights of the German minorities were infringed upon, shows the dangers that could be there. In the Russian political debate, there have been voices claiming that Russia should have a right to unilateral interventions in neighbouring countries in order to protect the interests of the approx. 25 million Russians living there.

It seems necessary to establish some sort of rule that interventions of this sort can never be seen as either legal or legitimate if not preceded by at the

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<sup>3</sup> It is striking how it is the very immediate, often military aims that dominate Wesley Clarks book "Waging Modern War", while the political and more long-term issues are nearly completely absent. There is, for example, no mention of the aims of the KLA and the compatibility, or non-compatibility, of these with NATO aims.

<sup>4</sup> It is sometimes claimed that the NATO intervention was key to the toppling of the Milosevic regime in Serbia and that this should be part of the balance sheet. But the short-term effect of the intervention was rather to strengthen the regime. Milosevic fell because of his own mistake of calling the September 2000 presidential elections and having to engineer a too massive vote fraud in order to try to win them. He failed.

least substantial and repeated debate in the UN Security Council. This would seem to provide a safeguard against the misuse of interventions to protect minorities or otherwise suffering populations, since there will then always be the possibility of the Security Council as such, or a majority of its members, taking a decision explicitly depriving an intervention of its legality. This did not happen in either the Kosovo or Iraq cases. Would it happen in another case, it is difficult to see that such an operation would have any legitimacy whatsoever.

The intervention in Iraq in 2003 can also serve as an illustration of the importance of the three criteria of legality, legitimacy and efficiency.

Here, the legal foundation for intervention were more clear than in the case in Kosovo in 1999, but the legitimacy of the operation far less either among public opinion in Europe or in the Arab or wider Muslim world.

As to the ultimate efficiency of the operation, it is of course much too early to judge. This is complicated by the fact that the aims of the intervention have been described in different ways, from enforcing the resolutions of the UN Security Council, over securing “regime change” in Iraq towards stimulating a fundamental reform of the different regimes of the Greater Middle East. While non-compliance with UNSC resolutions is no longer an issue, the ultimate effect of the intervention on the future of Iraq and the political evolution of the wider Arab world, including the issue of Palestine, will take a long time to assess.

In an even more profound way than Kosovo, the example of Iraq has demonstrated that the military intervention is just the first phase of a prolonged period of heavy involvement in the economic and political affairs of the region or the country in question. If one order or regime is destroyed by military intervention, ultimate responsibility for building a different and better order or regime often rests with the power responsible for the intervention.

The sometimes-popular phrase “regime change” hides both the comparatively easy first phase of “regime destruction”, and the much more complex and demanding phase of “regime construction”. If this second phase is not successful, the risk is that the attempted regime change results in a situation of chaos and disorder – “regime absence” – or a situation in which a fragile regime has to be kept from failing completely by an extensive international support mechanism.<sup>5</sup>

Particularly in the US debate, the notion of “regime change” has been introduced as a way of handling the threat of the spread of weapons of mass destruction. While the Clinton administration spoke about “rogue regimes”, and did not shy away from the concept of regime change in these cases, the Bush administration introduced the “axis of evil” encompassing the regimes in Pyongyang, Teheran and Iraq.

Subsequent events have demonstrated a reality that is more complex. Although only a medium-size country, the post-war operations in Iraq have tied down such a high portion of US ground force units that the United States has turned into a de facto weak global power in relation to other threats and situations that might occur. Whether imposed regime change would ever have been considered a realistic option in other cases or not, the reality is that at present there aren't the forces available to do it.

Pre-emptive use of military power to stop the development, deployment or use of weapons of mass destruction is not a new concept. During the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy contemplated pre-emptive air strikes against the ongoing deployment of Soviet medium-range missiles.<sup>6</sup> It is also highly likely that the Soviet leadership at some point looked into the

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<sup>5</sup> In the case of Iraq, this can be illustrated by the warning by the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to the Select Committee of Intelligence of the US Senate on February 24, 2004: “Iraq has the potential to serve as a training ground for the next generation of terrorists where novice recruits develop their skills, junior operatives hone their operational and planning capabilities, and relations mature between individuals and groups as was the case during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and extremist operations in the Balkans.” If this were to happen, it could be argued that the intervention has failed at least one of the important objectives stated for it.

<sup>6</sup> See the excellent discussions in Lawrence Freedman's acclaimed “Kennedy's Wars”.

possibility of pre-emptive strikes in order to prevent China from gaining an operational nuclear capability. And pre-emptive strikes were among the options considered by the Clinton administration when dealing with the North Korean situation prior to the 1994 agreement.

In all of these cases, detailed deliberations have showed that the risks associated with the pre-emptive option were greater than the possible benefits. In each of these cases, there was never any certainty that all of the weapons or facilities could have been destroyed, while the risk of counter-action taken by using assets that had not been hit were very substantial.

The only case of actual pre-emptive use of military power against a program of weapons of mass technologies was the Israeli air strike against the Osiraq reactor in Iraq in June 1981. Roundly condemned as a violation of international law,<sup>7</sup> the strike was a short-term success in that it did destroy the reactor. The overall effect was to drive the Iraqi nuclear effort in other directions, and had it not been for the decision of Saddam Hussein to launch the invasion of Kuwait before he had access to nuclear weapons, there is little doubt that Iraq would have been successful with its modified secret nuclear program.

The success of the Osiraq strike is thus somewhat debatable. It complicated and delayed the Iraqi nuclear efforts, but not much more than that. At the end, it was only the stupidity of Saddam Hussein in launching the Kuwait invasion too early that prevented Iraq from acquiring a nuclear capability.

If experience prior to the Iraq war thus had demonstrated the tactical as well as strategic difficulties with pre-emptive strikes against nations seen as harbouring plans to develop weapons of mass destruction, the Iraq war has of course further highlighted some of these. In all the previous cases, pre-emptive action was not undertaken due to the absence of sufficiently reliable

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<sup>7</sup> The UN Security Council – including the US – condemned the attack as “a clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct.”

intelligence as to the location at the moment of strike of every component of the alleged program or capability that needed taking out.

The Iraq war has certainly further underlined the limitations of even the most advanced intelligence gathering efforts in cases like these. Here, there was a failure both of tactical intelligence as to the location of individual facilities, and of strategic intelligence in terms of the overall nature of the threat.<sup>8</sup>

Strategies of pre-emptive use of military force must be based on intelligence capabilities far more reliable than those recently demonstrated. While the run-up to the Iraq war is an example of a threat exaggerated, we should also note that intelligence for a long time seems to have underestimated both the clandestine nuclear-selling network coming out of Pakistan as well as the nuclear and missile ambitions of Libya.

If an attempt to apply the criteria of “efficiency” to hard interventions in terms of weapons of mass destruction has thus demonstrated some of the difficulties, the situation is not much easier when it comes to hard interventions in order to safeguard basic human rights.

Here it might be useful to make a distinction between short-term and long-term effects. If there is the imminent threat of a massive violation of human rights, hard interventions will have to occur very fast and very efficient in order to prevent this from happening, while there is always the more long-term possibility that a hard intervention to change the regime of a nation or a region might produce a better situation in terms of human rights and basic humanitarian conditions.

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<sup>8</sup> One of the most glaring examples of tactical intelligence failures is the alleged bunker complex that caused the plans for the initiation of the war to be altered so that it could be attacked after reliable intelligence indicating that Saddam Hussein was present in it had been received. After the war, the location was revealed to be nothing more than an open field with big bomb craters. Bob Woodward’s “Plan of Attack”, Simon & Schuster 2004, gives the details of an extensive intelligence effort that in the end proved not to be reliable.

Srebrenica is often used as an example to describe the failures of international efforts, but can also serve as an illustration of the difficulties.

The fall of the Srebrenica enclave in Eastern Bosnia in July 1995 came as a surprise to the international community, and the subsequent massacre of thousands of men taken prisoner was not reliably known until weeks after they had taken place. Apart from the fact that it is highly doubtful that sufficient forces could have been brought to the remote Bosnian location of Srebrenica sufficiently fast to make a difference, there were neither intelligence nor other information that pointed either to the imminent fall of the enclave nor the massacres that followed. Even if forces are available, it is difficult to intervene against what you are not aware of.<sup>9</sup>

Kosovo illustrates some of the other limitations. Here, air power was singularly ineffective in affecting what was happening on the ground during the nearly three months of the air campaign. The Serb forces left Kosovo in good order and with more intact equipment than NATO intelligence has assessed they had at the beginning of the air campaign. If there was any effect on human rights violations in Kosovo itself during the nearly three months of air campaign it was in all likelihood distinctly negative. Thus, air power alone is a most dubious instrument of intervention when it comes to protecting human rights or preventing humanitarian emergencies.

The most frequently quoted example of a failure of the international community to intervene is the Rwanda genocide in 1994.

Here, there was already a UN mission on the ground, with its head trying to call attention to the risk of genocide and calling for a battalion of reinforcement in trying to prevent this. But the attention of the UN Secretariat as well as the Security Council was elsewhere – the Mogadishu debacle in Somalia had occurred in October of the preceding year – and the

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<sup>9</sup> Even after the fall of the enclave, and the humiliation of the international community this represented, it was difficult to mobilize action. France asked the United States for help with helicopters in order to get an assault force to the area, but the request was turned down as such an operation was deemed as too dangerous.

policy decided upon was instead a dramatic reduction of the UN presence in Rwanda. It is estimated that 800 000 Tutsis lost their lives in the genocide between April and June of that year.<sup>10</sup>

For any intervention to be able to satisfy the criteria of efficiency, it must be both timely and firm in its initial phase and prepared to stay the course for sometimes a very prolonged period in order to assure that the goals set are really met.

For the debate on humanitarian interventions, the report in December 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has been most important. Its central thesis that state sovereignty is dependent on a “responsibility to protect” paves the way for a right, perhaps even an obligation, for the international community to intervene if a state manifestly does not live up to its responsibility to protect its population, and other means to affect the situation are not available.

Using this concept, a hard intervention in a situation like this must be seen as a transfer of the responsibility to protect from the state structures of the area in question to the intervening parts of the international community. That responsibility then rests with the intervening authority or coalition until such time that state- or institution-building efforts have led to a situation that the responsibility to protect can safely be transferred back to more indigenous authorities.

If we see humanitarian interventions as an enforced transfer of the “responsibility to protect” to the intervening body, this has the advantage of focusing more of attention on the task of living up to that responsibility until such time as it can be transferred back again than on the short-term

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<sup>10</sup> Former US Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke made a forceful point on this issue in the Washington Post April 4 2004: “Had the Security Council agreed to the UN commander’s request and sent more troops, I believe, as do most observers, that at least half the deaths, if not more, could have been prevented. Instead, when the United Nations withdrew, the genocide exploded... It was not ‘the UN’ – that tall building on New York’s East River, overflowing with diplomatic talk – that decided to pull out. It was the leading nations of the world, speaking through their ambassadors in New York.”

intervention in itself. Such a focus on the efficiency over a longer time in ensuring the effectiveness of the intervention could help in focusing planning and preparation efforts on the essential post-intervention tasks more than so far often has been the case.

The demands that this approach puts on the international community should not be underestimated. If there were, for example, a requirement to make hard interventions and transfers of responsibility to protect in every case with a degree of violence similar or higher to Kosovo pre-March 1999, the capability of the international community, both in respect of quick early interventions and long-term peacekeeping and state building, would very soon be exhausted.

Thus, while we should be aware of the risks of us setting criteria's that will prevent us from intervening in acute situations of different sorts, we should also be aware of the risks of an "intervention overload" quickly leading to an "intervention fatigue" in the leading countries. Over time, this might turnout to be just as detrimental to the values and interests we are seeking to protect.

# # #

In December 2003, the countries of the European Union come together in agreeing on a European Security Strategy, thus making their first attempt to develop a common strategic culture and set out the policies to be pursued in the post-Westphalian area. It is expected that this European Security Strategy will be regularly revisited and reviewed.<sup>11</sup>

The European Security Strategy starts from the assumption that large-scale aggression against any member state is now improbable, and that the Union is instead faced with new threats that are more diverse, less visible and less predictable. Of these, the strategy mentions in particular terrorism,

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<sup>11</sup> "A secure Europe in a better world – European Security Strategy." Brussels 2003.

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime.

In discussing the different threats, the strategy underlines the dynamic nature of these, and stresses that accordingly “we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs.” It stresses that “conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.”

Key, from a European perspective, is to develop the instruments of the United Nations as the core of a system of “effective multilateralism”.

The addition of the word “effective” is a subtle shift of obvious political significance. It’s not multilateralism for the multilateralisms own sake, but multilateralism for better effectiveness in reaching the stated objectives. And in this also lies a commitment to constantly review and reform the different multilateral instruments in order to increase their effectiveness.

Within or outside this framework, the strategy stresses the need “to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.”

Much remains in order to develop the instruments and policies needed to transform the European Security Strategy into more of operational reality. But it should not be overlooked that its adoption represents a quantum leap in the attitude of the countries of the European Union to these issues. Previous feeble attempts at formulating a distinct European security strategy have all come to nothing. It required the twin trauma of September 11 and the disarray of the reaction to the Iraq war to mobilize the political will to make it possible.

In three areas, in particular, will it be necessary to develop the institutions and policies of the European Union.

The first is to develop the instruments of analysis and policy prediction so that potential crisis or conflicts can better be predicted, thus making it possible both to take European preventive action of whatever sort might be required and to alter the international community as a whole to the issue in question.

The second is to develop the instruments of increasingly hard, but still fundamentally soft, interventions in order to deal with the issue or challenge in question. Here, numerous approaches could be taken. In many cases, different parts of the UN system will be of critical importance, while in others political “coalitions of the willing” might be mobilized in order to try to address a particular issue.

And the third is obviously to have the means also for the extreme cases when a hard intervention, at the end of the day, might seem to be the only alternative left, providing it can meet a reasonable mix of the three criteria outlined above. Here the issue is less about providing the military forces for initial expeditionary warfare and more about assuring that the manpower and money is available for the follow-up mission that will decide the success or the failure of the intervention in question.

While the quantum leap of the adoption of the European Security Strategy had thus been taken, it is obvious that much remains. There is no denying that the strategic cultures of different European nations – sharpened by their respective historical experience – sometimes differ substantially, and that it will take a number of challenges until we see the firm emergence of the common strategic culture that the European Security Strategy must be based on. In our world of today, these challenges might however come faster than most people believe.

Of the recent experiences that contribute to the gradual shaping of this common strategic culture the Operation Artemis in the Bunia area of the Democratic Republic of Congo in the summer of 2004 is of particular

significance. Here the EU answered a call from the UN for the rapid deployment of a robust force to cover the critical time until the more regular UN peacekeeping force could be deployed. Using national units and relaying on national command assets (French) a multinational battalion-sized battle group was rapidly deployed to Congo and exited the area after having fulfilled its mission, handing over to the UN force that was then able to deploy. Without Operation Artemis, mass slaughter and killing might well have happened in the area.

This operation has led to both the setting up of a reinforced capability for planning military missions within the Secretariat of the Council of the European Union and to the plans to create 7 – 9 battalion-sized battle groups that could be deployed to any given location within 15 days. It's not only the ability that was demonstrated in Operation Artemis that has driven this, but also the recognition that if effective action should be taken to avert a threatening genocide or humanitarian disaster, it is only swift action that has any possibility of success. In the Rwandan case, a deployment of a force of this size within this time frame would in all probability have prevented most – if not all – of the killing that happened.

As the European Union gradually develops these more robust intervention capabilities, it will be able to act more effectively primarily in support of actions authorized by the UN Security Council, but conceivable also in situations where European interests or values are seen as directly threatened, but where a clear-cut mandate from the Security Council for the one reason or the other is not possible. To try to lay down too strict rules in advance for what type of missions these could be is a futile exercise – reality is likely to continue to outstrip our fantasy.

Parallel to the development of these military battle-groups, it seems important that the European Union develops a concept of political intervention-groups that tries to prevent different conflicts or to resolve them well before a hard intervention becomes necessary. I use the term political

intervention-groups since it is perfectly feasible that the core groups executing different policies will be different in different cases, although operating within the same policy framework and to a large extent utilizing the evolving machinery of the Common Foreign and Security Policy to coordinate their action as well as to keep the other member countries fully in the picture.

Although it is easy to see that the United Kingdom and France, in view both of their positions on the UN Security Council and their diplomatic and military capabilities, as well as Germany, in view of its political and economic weight, will be more present in these groups than most other EU member countries, fears for the emergence of an exclusive triumvirate to speak for Europe are in all probability grossly overblown. In the past, we have seen Italy take a leadership role on an issue like Albania in the very successful Operation Alba intervention in that country in April-August 1997, and few would doubt that Spain is likely to be a key partner in any policy in the direction of either Latin America or the Maghreb countries.

What will be needed is a more coherent capability to analyse different emerging challenges and to try to shape the policies that could prevent them from bursting into open conflicts. There is also the need for more flexible instruments of informal diplomacy, as well as for more coherent policy support to the increasingly demanding state-building operations that will be undertaken across the globe. In most cases, the European component in them will be substantial, and it is thus appropriate that the European Union develops a more comprehensive approach to these issues.

It's against this background that I have previously argued for the setting up of a European Institute of Peace, bringing important governmental as well as non-governmental resources in these areas together under one roof, and thus facilitating both a better common understanding of the different

problems, a sometimes more informal way of handling them and a more coherent policy approach to the extremely demanding state-building tasks.<sup>12</sup>

In addition to developing its own capabilities in all of these areas, the European Union could assist in the development of the capabilities of other regional organisations. This applies in particular to the African Union. The initiative by the European Commission to set up an African Peacekeeping Facility to help in financing both the training and the deployment of regional African peacekeeping forces is an important step that shows great promise for the future.

Great importance must continue to be attached to the cooperative relationship between Nato and the European Union. Under the so-called Berlin Plus arrangements, the EU has already undertaken a minor peacekeeping operation in Macedonia, and is now scheduled to take over in Bosnia after the completion of the Nato mission there.

It should be recognized, however, that many of the issues we are likely to be confronted with are likely to require a more multi-faceted approach than the one that can be offered by a security organisation alone. Nato will continue to be the default option for robust peace- and stability operations, but they must take place within a political framework that also utilizes all the other peace-, stability- and state-building instruments at the disposal of not least the European Union.

The European Union will not, neither has it the ambition to, emerge as a global strategic player en par with the United States. It will always lack the completeness of the global strategic view and its assets primarily in the harder parts of the military spectrum will always be more limited. But

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<sup>12</sup> A somewhat related proposal to set up a European Foundation for Good Governance was recently put forward by Mark Leonard and Richard Gowan in "Global Europe: Implementing the European Security Strategy", published by British Council Brussels and The Foreign Policy Center. In the United States, the US Institute for Peace as well as the National Endowment for Democracy fulfils much the same roles as intended for these two European institutions. There is no doubt that the ability to deal with different global issues would improve if there were also more focused European efforts in these respects. The existing EU Institute for Security Studies fulfils different tasks.

notwithstanding this, it is both desirable and likely that, as part of the efforts to meet the new global challenges, the European Union will develop both the new strategic culture that the European Security Strategy calls for and the different instruments necessary to put that strategy culture to concrete operational use.

As this happens, the prospects for handling the new global challenges are bound to improve.

# # #

As we confront the new challenges, three tasks should be in focus, the first of which is to recognise the magnitude of the challenges we are confronted with. If the fundamental pillars of the Westphalian system have eroded or even collapsed, we are likely to be in a prolonged and uncertain period of transition to an emerging post-Westphalian international order.

It will take its time for this order to find its shape. But based on our experience so far it is likely to be based less on the independence and more on the interdependence between states and societies, less on national sovereignty and more on sovereignty in different layers, less on non-intervention than on permanent intervention and more on networks than on nations<sup>13</sup>.

We must handle the emerging new dominance of the politics of identity, in contrast to the politics of ideology of the past, in a world of rapidly accelerating globalisation and of the ongoing scientific and technological revolution.

It is little more than a decade ago since Samuel Huntington issued his stark warning that we heading towards “the clash of civilisation and the remaking

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<sup>13</sup> This later point is argued by Anne-Marie Slaughter in her “A New World Order”, Princeton University Press 2004.

of the world order”<sup>14</sup>. A decade is a short period, but it is easy to see that he was more right than wrong, although the dominant clashes might well be within rather than between civilisations, with the escalating struggle between the idea of reform and the urge of reaction inside Islam as the dominating “civilizational” issue affecting the structure of the international order.

It is too early to judge how profound this “civilizational” conflict will be in the years and decades ahead. That we are faced with a totalitarian jihad with profound implications is beyond doubt, but it is far from clear how the balance between the forces of reform and reaction will develop in the different parts of the Muslim world in the years ahead.

A possible parallel is with what happened inside in Europe half a millennium ago as the reformation spread across the then Christian world, upsetting the political order and ushering the era of confrontation that ended only with the Westphalian settlement of 1648. But it was a long and turbulent time between Luther nailing his theses on the church door in Wittenberg in 1517 and that settlement.

At the same time as battle for the hearts and minds of the Muslim world goes on, other forces of disruption are reshaping the global landscape. The accelerating process of globalisation brings the prospect of both prosperity and freedom to further hundreds of millions of people across the world, as we have seen with such success from Shanghai to Santiago during the past decades.

But at the same time this process disrupts established patterns, challenges cultures and provokes resistance. The accelerating interdependence also fuels the rise of the politics of identity, with its possible destructive consequences.

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<sup>14</sup> Originally he laid out his thesis in an article *Foreign Affairs* in the summer of 1993, and then in his book in 1996.

In this volatile world of dynamic threats, the United States has emerged as the dominant power par excellence, with a military budget that equals what most other spends together, and with a global reach and space dominance than no one can even think of rival.

But this is only part of the story. At the same time as this is happening, this United States feels more insecure than perhaps at any time in modern history, and is becoming increasingly aware of the very real limitations of its own powers. It might have unrivalled control of outer space, but it is certainly no superpower in the back streets of Baghdad, finds its army desperately overstretched and must note that popular opinion in states and regions of key importance for the future is turning increasingly against it.<sup>15</sup>

The paradox of the present situation is that the United States is an extreme superpower in relation to the other powers, but certainly not in relation to the challenges it is confronted with in large areas of the world.

If we did not have the United Nations, statesmen of all countries are certain to have been busy trying to set it up. There are certainly differences in the degree to which it is seen as the key instrument for handling the different global challenges, but only the most extreme would challenge the notion that we need an effective instrument of inclusive multi-nationalism of the sort that the United Nations is.

The Secretary-General has recently set up his High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes to study global security threats and recommend necessary changes.<sup>16</sup> It is due to report in December 2004.

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<sup>15</sup> Support for the US war against terrorism in large parts of the world is low, ranging from 56 % in Kuwait to 2 % among Palestinians and Jordanians. Support for America has dropped in most of the Muslim world. Favourable ratings in Morocco declined from 77 % in 2000 to 27 % in spring of 2004 and in Jordan from 25 % in 2002 to only 5 % in 2004 (Pew Research Center, 16/03/2004). The percentage of Saudis expressing confidence in the US dropped from 63 % in May 2000 to 11 % in October 2003.

<sup>16</sup> Set up in November 2003. Former Thai Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun heads the 15-member panel.

It is less likely that the Panel will recommend sweeping changes to the basic structure that was agreed on in San Francisco in 1945. Attempts to rewrite the Charter, or to alter the composition of key institutions, however worthy these efforts might be, are unlikely to lead to more than prolonged and ultimately futile diplomatic battles that risk diverting attention from what really can and ought to be done.

The United Nations is an organisation in need of reform since the United Nations is an organisation very much needed in the present global situation. There is a constant need to reform and improve its political, peacekeeping as well as humanitarian operations, and to make certain that the full panoply of international organisations belonging to or related to the UN family operates towards common goals.

The Millennium Development Goals, agreed by Millennium Summit in 2000, is a most important attempt to focus multilateral as well as national attempts towards common goals of obvious global significance. Although one should be careful in not overloading the system with a multitude of complicated commitment, assuring little more than the neglect of them all, it is useful to try to occasionally bring major elements of the international community together in common goals like these. Although bodies like the G8 or the G20 are important in calling attention to different issues, there is no alternative to anchoring processes like these in the UN system.

After a period in which the organisation came in for much criticism, we have now entered a phase in which the peacekeeping operations of the UN are again expanding very fast. At the time of writing this, the UN had approx. 48 000 troops deployed, but before the end of this year this figure is likely to increase up to approx. 70 000 troops. The UN missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia have recently expanded, a mission in Ivory

Coast is starting up, and further missions are likely in Burundi, Haiti and Sudan.<sup>17</sup>

These UN missions come on top of even larger missions undertaken by different coalitions in other areas. In the Balkans, Nato is still responsible for substantial stability operations in both Kosovo and Bosnia, with the upsurge in ethnic violence in the former in mid-March making any plans for further reductions impossible. In Afghanistan, Nato has taken over responsibility for the ISAF force, primarily around Kabul, while a substantially larger US force operates with a different mandate in the country. In Iraq, initial plans to slim down the US troops presence in the country to approx. 30 000 soldiers after the war have proved utterly unrealistic, and most observers would agree that present total force levels in the country are still insufficient to create a sufficiently secure framework for a successful political process.

In all these cases, we are confronted with complex state-building operations of which the attempt to establish a secure environment is only the necessary beginning. Be it in West Africa, the Great Lakes region or the vast post-Ottoman area that includes both former Yugoslavia and present Iraq, the tasks are of a magnitude that will require vast resources and firm commitment for many years to come.

Based on the so-called Brahimi Report, the UN has improved its system of managing peacekeeping operations. The Brahimi Report was however issued in a period in which the concept of nation- or state-building was heavily contested, and in a diplomatic way steered clear of practically all of the very demanding challenges that such task will involve. Apart from some vague words about what it referred to as peace building, it did not address what is increasingly turning out to be the major task that most of the rapidly expanding UN and other multinational operations are now confronted with.

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<sup>17</sup> Briefing by UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, March 24 2004.

This is no longer sufficient. It is neither narrow peacekeeping, nor undefined so called nation building, but concrete state building, that will have to be the focus of most of these operations in the years and decades ahead. The UN must go beyond what the Brahimi Report was able to say, draw on the lessons that have been learnt in the years that have passed, and see if it can evolve into the international community's default mechanism for state-building operations in key areas of the world.

In a world in which many of the threats to global stability and security are coming from fragile, failing or failed states, the importance of state-building or –reforming capabilities for global stability might be compared with the importance of nuclear deterrence for stability during the decades of the Cold War.

It is realistic to expect that the European Union over time will be ready to take responsibility for these kinds of efforts in its immediate near abroad, and it can not be excluded that there will be cases where the United States will prefer to take the political lead in the way that is today the case in Iraq. But given the number of operations that we are likely to see in the years to come it remains the United Nations that will be mandated to undertake the most of them. Thus, the reinforcement of its capabilities in this area is of critical importance to global security in the decades ahead.

This will never be possible if these efforts do not have solid support from the key international actors. I have already dealt with the different efforts underway inside the European Union, as well as with the further steps that are necessary. It is worth noting that it is with the support of the United States that the present, almost unprecedented expansion of peacekeeping operations is taking place. From a beginning in the UN operation in Cambodia, to the present difficult situation in Iraq, we also see a more active and important role played by Japan on these issues. Japan has also taken an active interest in the political efforts both in the Balkans and in Afghanistan.

But efforts in areas of fragile, failing or failed states must not be restricted to heavy state-building operations of this sort. It is worth noting the efforts undertaken in recent years by the UN Development Program to develop programs to improve governance, and establish different indicators that could warn against developments that might threaten the stability of states or regions. While not intrusive in themselves, these efforts can provide important support to other international efforts<sup>18</sup>. The emphasis put on issues of good governance and reform by the UNDP is worth supporting and developing further.

In a large number of other areas, it will be of importance to develop the different multilateral instruments of soft intervention to handle the new challenges.

When the Security Council adopted its resolution 1373 in September 2001, it took the important step of declaring that “any act of international terrorism constitute a threat to international peace and security”, and immediately thereafter reaffirmed “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence”. In this resolution the Counter-Terrorism Committee was set up, composed of the members of the Security Council, and although CTC has been beset by problems, it has become a key instrument in giving legitimacy to the global efforts against terrorism. Further steps to strengthen and improve the functioning of the CTC must be discussed.

Other areas where instruments must be reinforced are all those related to proliferation of technologies of mass destruction. The IAEA Additional Protocol, with its more intrusive inspections, should form part of the core commitment required of states part of the system. There are also important discussions underway on the possibility of further control of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, thus also making it more possible to take a positive look

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<sup>18</sup> The 2002 Arab Human Development Report is an excellent example. It quickly became the basis for the wide-ranging debate about the need for reforms in the Arab world.

at the increased use of nuclear power to meet the increasing electricity needs in different parts of the world. Consideration should be given to making the Proliferation Security Initiative more formally a part of the multilateral system, although one should not underestimate the important role of informal groups like the Nuclear Suppliers Group or the Wassenaar Group when it comes to controlling critical technologies.

If the first conclusion relates to the need to understand the magnitude of the change that we are in the middle of, and the second the importance of improving and developing the international instruments for managing interdependence and handling state-building tasks, the third relates to the need to improve the ability of different actors – not least in the Trilateral countries - to act within this reformed international system.

It is easy to see that the trilateral world faces major deficiencies in what we might call 3D spending and efforts – *diplomacy, development and defence*. If we add together the share of our GDP spent on 3D efforts for global stability, we are likely to find that they were at the beginning of the new century lower than they have been previously in modern times.

This will have to be changed. Under the heading of *diplomatic* efforts we must increase resources and improve capabilities of preventive political action on different issues and in different parts of the world. Some of the possible avenues of approach have been indicated above. Under the heading of *development* should be grouped not only a reinforced commitment to the Millennium Development Goals, but also a stronger emphasis on all the issues of governance, democracy and reform throughout the world. And under the heading of *defence* we will have to accommodate the costs for the increases in manpower available not primarily for quick hard intervention operations, but for long-term stability operations as part not least of state building efforts in volatile areas.

It is difficult to put numbers to the ambitions we must have in these fields, but it is certainly not an unreasonable conclusion of the new and more challenging international environment that we should seek to increase by at least 50 % the share of GNP we spend on these combined 3D efforts for global stability. When this is done, spending on peace and security for our citizens is still likely to be below what it was during the height of the Cold War.

To do significantly less is to abdicate from responsibility for the future stability of our world.